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Abstract
This paper investigates failure of startups due to their accumulation of intellectual property rights (IPR) in
the context of the wireless telecommunication industry, here framed as their technology space - a space
that we constructed through shared technology. Obtaining intellectual property rights forms an important
signal for startup viability but only to a limited degree, compelling us to posit a U shape relationship
between failure rate and IPR flow. The location of startups in the technology space, and the associated
signals that come with that location presents powerful information regarding their failure rates.
Disclosing intellectual properties erodes the benefits of secrecy and innovative lead time as deference (as
proxied by patent citations) by peer to new firms increases their hazard of failure due potential
competition and harmful spillover effects - particularly if the sector manifests a weak appropriability
regime. Technology concentration of the deference is also found to be harmful; however the interaction of
the two is positive. This leads us to infer that startups with specific and focused technology
acknowledged many other firms or those with general but deferred to by few others have better possibility
of stemming the rot.
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T E CHNOL OGY SP ACE ACT I VI T Y AND F AI L URE
A STUDY OF HI-TECH VC-BACKED WIRELESS STARTUPS

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates failure of startups due to their accumulation of intellectual
property rights (IPR) in the context of the wireless telecommunication industry, here
framed as their technology space - a space that we constructed through shared technology.
Obtaining intellectual property rights forms an important signal for startup viability but
only to a limited degree, compelling us to posit a U shape relationship between failure
rate and IPR flow. The location of startups in the technology space, and the associated
signals that come with that location presents powerful information regarding their failure
rates. Disclosing intellectual properties erodes the benefits of secrecy and innovative lead
time as deference (as proxied by patent citations) by peer to new firms increases their
hazard of failure due potential competition and harmful spillover effects - particularly if
the sector manifests a weak appropriability regime. Technology concentration of the
deference is also found to be harmful; however the interaction of the two is positive. This
leads us to infer that startups with specific and focused technology acknowledged many
other firms or those with general but deferred to by few others have better possibility of
stemming the rot.
Keywords: Technology space; failure; wireless; technological innovation;
entrepreneurship; IPR strategy
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INTRODUCTION
“Intellectual property portfolios are the lifeblood of many wireless tech firms. But patent
disputes can cost millions of dollars to defend and take years to resolve”
- Cover Story, Wireless Week, August 15, 2005

We observe a peculiar split in the literature regarding technological evolution and
firm survival. On the on hand some authors address the failure of large established firms
that bring along the baggage of their legacy technological platform as the sector endures
some major disruptions (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Tushman & Anderson 1986;
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Henderson 1993). On the other hand many other studies
explore the success and failure of firms, whose technological platform coincides with the
stage of their sector’s technological evolution and where quality of new firms are
signaled reasonably through the granting of intellectual property rights with concomitant
endorsements from incumbents (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008).
Affiliation with prominent third parties is shown to have important certification benefits
diminishing the odds of failure and improving the chance of going public. Patent grants
have positive effects on valuations obtained during financing thus establishing their
importance as signals of quality. The present study tries to add to these literatures by
focusing on a context where discontinuous technological changes are managed by
incumbents and where disclosure and endorsements might have important costs that
outweigh their benefits, especially in the technology domain.
The appropriability regime of a firm’s sector conditions its technology strategy
(Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 1994; Klevorick,
Levin, Nelson, Winter, 1995). The sector that is the subject of this paper, wireless and
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mobile communication is characterized by use of trade secrets and lead times in
innovations, which far outweigh patenting, and the disclosure of intellectual property as a
signaling mechanism might be fraught with harmful spillover and imitation, not to
mention the threat of potential, very costly patent litigation, as highlighted in the opening
quote. The same holds for third-party certification, especially endorsement by prominent
firms who not only control important complementary assets like customers and
distribution but also enjoy an undue hegemony around the shaping of technological
direction and dominant designs. This is especially true for the wireless and mobile
communication industry where operators like Verizon and Vodafone control the end
users and vendors like Nokia and Qualcomm define the technology platforms.
In the following parts of this paper we first develop theory and testable
hypotheses. We provide a description of the empirical setting and brief history of the
sector. Next we describe the dataset, analysis, and results. The main research question
addresses the effect of a new venture’s technological conduct on failure rate in a sector
that is highly contested and dominated by major competitors along the value chain. Any
nascent firm in this sector faces the dilemma of signaling technological advancement and
enhanced certification at the cost of reverse engineering or infringement claims that are
product of a poor appropriability regime. While intellectual property grants can be
construed as milestones that confer legitimacy to a startup they also expose the firm to
spillovers and imitation, resulting paradoxically in trade secrets and non-disclosure as a
more favorable avenue in securing a competitive technological advantage. We conclude
by making some inferences about the results and future path.

Working Paper: Do not cite
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The technology strategy that a startup pursues hinges on the conditions in its
domain of technology. The intellectual property rights (IPR) strategy assumed by a firm
depends very much on the appropriability regime (Teece, 1986) in that domain as well as
on the direction and velocity of its technological trajectory. The pertinent literature is
replete with highly visible framings of its history including the rise and fall of a dominant
design (Utterback, 1994), incremental and radical innovation (Tushman & Anderson,
1986; Henderson & Clark, 1994), core change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and
disruption (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Many empirical studies underscored the role of
discontinuous innovations in toppling established incumbents. Invariably they impute an
unmanaged evolution as in organic life forms. Other studies, however, imply some
visible (Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom, 1992) or invisible (Van de Ven and Garud,
1994) hand in driving the speed and direction of technology, and suggest that its
trajectories are shaped through formal standard setting and collusive practices. The
wireless sector is one such area of activity, where regulatory bodies, standard setting
consortia and the market power of large firms render the sector checkered and gradual in
its development. Finding an optimum strategy in such an “technology space” is most
challenging, especially for small new entrants.
Startup Technology Space
We conceptualize technology space as the network formed between firms through
sharing the same technology activity over the course of the sector’s history. Since there is
a strong incentive to innovate in similar and incremental technologies a pronounced
core/periphery distinction is to be expected. Attempts at radical innovations reside at the
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periphery while those that conform to prevailing norms and practices occupy central
positions. Concurrent with the aggregate evolution, startups build up their technology
platform and try to establish their legitimacy and so disclose their intellectual property
incrementally. We believe that in doing so they endure their technological edge as a
double edged sword: depending on the balance they fail or survive. In the following
paragraphs we elaborate.

IPR as Signal
In the absence of credible, established track records, startup firms signal the
underlying value of their venture to investors and other stakeholders. In their study on
semiconductor firms, Hsu & Ziedonis (2008) show that IPRs significantly determines
venture valuations, ceteris paribus and fosters the likelihood of sourcing a prominent VC
in the first funding round. Their semiconductor sector also exhibits an unfavorable
appropriability regime. If the filing and granting of patents confers such positive
signaling benefits, we should expect in our setting likewise IPR’s to perform and
important signaling function in attracting new investors and convince existing promoters
of its viability. However, this benefit of growth in IPR does not accrue monotonically.
Instead we should anticipate decreasing returns to R&D output as investors and other
stakeholders update their evaluation of quality over time. Patenting is not only costly but
also is afflicted with unwanted and harmful spillovers and imitation.
We therefore hypothesize:
H1. The yearly flow of patents granted to a startup has a U-shaped relationship
with its hazard of failure
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Distance in Technology Space (Core/Periphery Structure)
A sector characterized by a core-periphery structure, a putative directionality in
technological developments and widely shared, established industry standards reward
startups that innovate in its core technologies. The case of ComSpace Corp, a Texas
based company that received $26 million in equity financing from the likes of Sevin
Rosen Funds and Noro-Moseley Partners illustrates this trend quite convincingly. It
owned about 20 patents, which allowed an eightfold amount of traffic to be carried over
existing radio channels. Called Digital Multicarrier Architecture -- DCMA for short – the
technology also handled data, meaning it could be used for wireless access of the Internet,
short-text messaging, e-mail and video. However, DCMA in spite of sharing a nearly
identical acronym with Code Division Multiplex Access (CDMA), one of the core
technologies standardized by industry incumbents, but not occupying a location in the
core of wireless technology quickly vanished from the sector.
Thus, based on this cursory discussion we predict:
H2. The location of a firm in terms of closeness centrality in the technology space
lowers its failure hazard rate.

Deference in the Technology Space – From Whom
Once a startup discloses its production of intellectual property, other firms grant
deference by acknowledging its R&D output as prior art. The act of deference is deemed
beneficial and when revealed by prominent alters confers status (Podolny 2005). This
argument assumes no costs to the actor receiving the deference. While this is generally
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true in social settings where ambiguity abounds, given the nature of our context,
disclosure is costly since its exposes the startups to imitation and other forms of
appropraibility. This drawback of deference poses a challenge to the startup, especially
when they originate from other firms rather than individuals. Continuing the example of
ComSpace, its technology received the attention of industry giants such as Marconi,
Ericsson, Sony and Nokia, which however did not have licensing agreements with
ComSpace. An exception was a Hitachi business unit which did license. The higher the
number of firms that acknowledges a firm’s IPR, the more difficult is it for its owner to
monetize it into revenue producing licensing agreements. Given the additional threat of
litigation from powerful players in a highly contested domain the threat of failure is
exacerbated when high levels of deference make it difficult for a start up to manage its
R&D portfolio. .
We therefore posit:
H3. Failure hazard rate is positively associated with the flow of deference a
starup receives from peer firms.

Deference in the Technology Space – Technology Concentration
The generality of a firms’ technology is determined by the diversity of domains it
receives deference from. A more general purpose technology will likely have more
applications than a firm that restricts itself to a narrow range of technology. Some
startups thrive by search for applications outside its sector even if proximate industry
peers shun them. Whether a startup‘s technology platform is general or specific can be
inferred from the breadth of technology citing its IPR as prior art. Danger Inc., the
creator of the Sidekick illustrates this case when they sold themselves to Microsoft where
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their current objective is to build great, intuitive client software for mobile handsets
connected to hosted back-end services rather than their initial focus creating specific
wireless devices themselves. Therefore a firm’s chances of avoiding failure grows if its
technology enjoys wider appeal, the acknowledgement of its R&D output is dispersed
over a wider audience of peers, while firms with a very specific technology, as inferred
from the diffusion or dispersion of its audiences technology domains, are prone to failure
which leads to the next hypothesis:
H4. The higher the concentration of deference flow that a firm receives, greater is
the failure rate.

Deference in the Technology Space – When Does it Hurt?
Based on our arguments on the number of deference received, and the technology
concentration imputed in the above paragraphs we can deduce that a focused startup is
better capable to contain spillover and in policing its IPR portfolio. Similarly, it will
easier to handle a general purpose technology if fewer peer firms recognize its prior art.
By contrast, a comparative large technological audience with a general purpose
technology is very challenging for a startup to cope with. Thus we predict an interaction
effect:
H5. The interaction between the concentration of deference flow and the flow of
the number of peers’ acknowledgements is negatively related to its failure hazard
rate.

Working Paper: Do not cite

METHODS
Research Setting
We conducted this study in the wireless sector and focus on venture funded
startups in the US. Wireless or mobile communication is chosen since the appropriability
regime is relatively weak as required by our theory. Although the firms are located in the
US, their scope is global. Wireless is a global industry with multinational firms such as
Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, Samsung, Motorola, T-Mobile and Vodafone dominating
the competitive landscape. Although the sector has a very complex value network with a
variety of corporation as illustrated in figure 1 (Camponovo & Pigneur, 2002), it is
dominated by the network operators and the vendors of equipments and handsets.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------------The high growth potential and variety of opportunities across the value network
due deregulation and technology changes have spurred a high level of startup activity.
These activities have been global although dominated by US based firms as shown below.
Next the history of the sector is briefly reviewed.

-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------------------------------
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Brief History of Wireless 1990-2009
Wireless has experienced tremendous growth since the early nineties with the
introduction of digital technologies in cellular systems. The introduction of GSM
(Global System for Mobile communications) in Europe in 1991 was a fundamental driver
made possible through a wave of technological, institutional and market innovations.
Although there was inter-regional heterogeneity, these so called 2G (second generation
technologies which were all digital) cellular technologies kick started the innovations that
received a lot of attention and money from venture capitalists through the boom and bust
of the Internet, peaking in 2006. While cellular technologies anchor the wireless arena,
the innovations in the sector are not just limited to them. Wi-Fi, WiMax, Bluetooth,
UWB, ZigBee, GPS and RFID represent some of the other technologies that were
developed and financed by investors. Figure 3 and 4 below illustrate the relationship
between the various technologies classified according to two dimensions, the coverage
area and bandwidth. These two dimensions are a function of the frequency spectrum used
by the technology and limited by the physics of that space.
Coverage area is determined by the distance the waves propagate and the ease
with which they penetrate dense obstacles like walls and trees. The bandwidth determines
the maximum information carrying capacity of the medium and is conditioned by the
energy that a signal can carry which is limited by the spectrum space, technology and
regulations. A unifying force behind all these technologies is the trade-off between
coverage and bandwidth that has led to the need for co-existence among these
technologies as no single wireless technology can fulfill all the demands of wireless
applications. This has become extremely important with the introduction of data services
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on cellular systems with the transition to data focused 2.5G and 3G standards starting at
the turn of this century. Voice, the predominant application of cellular system, is poised
to become one among many data applications with varying bandwidth needs. Another
significant effect of this movement towards data is that technologies in software,
applications and content for wireless have received a lot of attention. Thus the traditional
concentration on components, equipments, systems and management software has been
complemented with spot on software, applications and content for mobile data services.
Wireless Startup “Technology space”
Several authors have tried to categorize the technology space and the European
Patent Office even provides an IP “web-guide” by country, scientific field and other
classes. In this paper we construct the technology space by dint of a time invariant
network of US startup firms founded between 1990 and 2009 whose accumulation of
intellectual property becomes spatially tied to that of other firms through shared IPC
technology classes. In other words, technology similarity is captured through shared
technology classes and is used to capture the core-peripheral structure of this field. We
used Derwent, a database of patents maintained by Thomson to collect patents of all the
startups in our sample and the assigned IPC codes. We use Derwent because it is a
database of global patents. Since the ambit of activity of our startups is international in
nature, using Derwent is more appropriate than using the USPTO database. Figure 1
shows the startup technology space. We can clearly see the core-periphery structure as
posited in the section on theory.
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-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here
-------------------------------------------

Data & Sample
We test our theory using the population of all firms in the US wireless and mobile
communication sector that were founded between the year 1990 to 2009 and received at
least one round of early stage VC funding. There are 428 such firms as documented by
VentureXpert, the leading source of information on Venture Capital from Thomson
Research, commonly viewed as the most comprehensive and widely used database for
research on venture funded companies. We classify startups as wireless firms using the
Venture Economics Industry Classification (VEIC) of Thomson with those residing
within the VEIC codes of 1300-1399 range. We supplement the VEIC code with a
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code from SDC Platinum, Hoovers and CorpTech.
The data for this study came from a variety of sources. While the main information on
our sample on firms, including their their financing and products came from
VentureXpert IPR information was obtained from Derwent, a database of global patents
maintained by Thomson since 1969 and frequently used previously in strategic
management research (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Eggers, 2008). The
Thompson IPR database provided much better coverage for our sample of firms (more
than 25% firms have patents when compared to the USPTO) because of its global reach.
Other data related to alliances were collected from three different archives, SDC
Platinum, Factiva and the historical websites using the Wayback machine
(http://web.archive.org). For Merger & Acquisition & IPO data we used SDC, Zephyr,
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Factiva and Hoovers primarily. Finally COMPUSTAT was accessed for segment data on
wireless firms which are in the public domain.
Dependent Variables
Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables used in our analysis. Since we are
using a competing risk model of either a successful or failed outcome, we identify these
outcomes and create firm-year spells from founding to outcome or censoring at the end of
2009. We identify firms that were liquidated as outright bankrupt or were acquired in a
distressed sale (dummy variable Failures) in the year of exit. Those that experience an
IPO or were acquired are flagged as successful firms (dummy variable Successes) in the
year of the event. We model the hazard rate using the time to either of these outcomes
experienced by the firm from birth.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------------Independent Variables
Patent Grant Flow is a variable that captures the number of patent granted to a
firm in a given year and signals to its audiences the creation of property . We capture its
location in the technology space by calculating the closeness centrality in a network
constructed through shared IPC classes. The variable Closeness centrality in startup
technology space captures its peripheral to core position, with increasing value from 0 to
1. This metric is time invariant over the widow of study.
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Deference is measured with an annual count variable, Patent Cite Flow by Firms,
which is the number of forward citations received by the firm from peer organizations in
a given year.
Finally, we quantified a firm’s annual audience diversity as the inverse of the
heterogeneity in forward citations received. That diversity is captured by the Hefindahl
index of IPC classes associated with patent classes of firms which cite the focal startup’s
newly granted IPR. We surmise that the startup’s peers as competitive audience which
mention the startup’s patents and which belong to a relatively narrow band of
technologies, its IPR should be viewed as very focused and specialized. The variable

Concentration of Fw Cite Flow, by computing the sum of the square of the share of each
of the IPC classes of the patents citing the firm.
Control Variables
Obviously we ought to hold many factors, associated with entrepreneurial firms,
constant that others have identified as shaping the viability and eventual success or
failure among new ventures. These controls can be categorized in five broad categories.
First, related to IPR we include the stock of patents granted and forward cites received .
We also control for the total flow of forward cites, signaling the aggregate value of a
startup’s IPR. The second category controls for exit market conditions that either
constrain or embellish a startups outlook. . The intensity of annual IPO activity in a
startup”s four digit defined industry as well as the annual incidence of acquisitive
activity inn that industry is computed. The third group of control variables holds
investor characteristic constant. These include the number of investors, whether the
investors are corporate venture capitalists and the number of investors who invest in all
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rounds of financing. These controls are often deemed important in moving a new venture
beyond the adolescent stage. Fourth, related to the financing received, we control for the
number of financing and time to the first date of VC financing. Finally, the fifth category
includes so called corporate development actions, i.e., namely strategic alliances and
acquisitions. We also included a control variable at sector level, growth using total sales
per year of all business segments that publicly quoted wireless operators and vendors
operate in and entry year of the startup i.e., left censoring in the event history model.
Method
We use a competing risk Cox proportional hazard model (Lee & Wang, 2003) of
the wireless startup outcome rate. The idea of the competing risks model is to let the
hazard rate vary with the end state. In the framework of a competing risks model, the
duration corresponding to the state not realized is truncated. From a methodological point
of view, this implies that the realized state will contribute to the likelihood function via
its density function, while the truncated state contributes to the likelihood function via its
survivor function. Competing risks models focus on both the type of exits and time to exit
(duration). In contrast, a Logit model for example would only focus on the type of exit
(binary choice) and the likelihood function of a Logit model would not take into account
the time variable (compare JBF, 2005). The regressions were computed using the stcox
procedure of STATA.

RESULTS
Table 2 present the correlations and descriptive statistics of the variables included
in the analysis. We ran diagnostics for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation

Working Paper: Do not cite
Factor (vif) procedure after running an OLS regression in STATA and found no
significant issues in spite of the relatively high correlation among several variables. On
average fa irm in our study obtains one patent per year, received approximately four cites
per year and exhibits a technology concentration (Herfindahl) of 12% among its forward
citations. The average closeness centrality is 0.01 with a maximum of 0.02.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
------------------------------------------The five hypotheses were tested by fitting a competing risk Cox proportional
hazard model to the data as elaborated above. Table 3a & 3b presents the results for the
two competing risks, failure and success. Our main hypotheses apply to the case of
failure. We contrast these results with those involving to bolster the robustness of our
inferences.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3a & 3b about here
------------------------------------------The two tables show seven models that we fitted. Model 7 is the full model that
we will use for our analysis. Hypothesis 1 posited a U shaped relationship between the
failure hazard rate and the flow of patents received. This is strongly supported in model
both model 6 & 7 in Table 3a with a negative main effect and a positive effect for the
quadratic term. Thus the value of patents as signal hypothesis is corroborated
Interestingly the case of successful outcome also gives moderate support (5%
significance) to this thesis (model 7 Table 3b). The success rate is inverse U shaped with
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respect to patent grant. Thus in our view the benefits of signaling by a startup are
important and outweighs the costs of disclosure.
H2 is also strongly supported in all the models in Table 3a, suggecting that
startups fare better if they are central within the wireless sector, while those located in
marginal locations face early exits . Paradoxically, Table 3b shows that it is a “non
factor” for success. H3 is strongly supported in model 7 but only mildly in model 6.
While cites by firms are harmful, total cites are beneficial. Also this variable has no effect
for the case of success, once again showing that the mechanisms driving failure and
success are very different. H4 is strongly supported in model (7). Diversity is conducive
to reduced risk but is not conducive to IPO or acquisition—our outcome of success..
Finally H5 provides intriguing yet compelling evidence regarding the outlook of fledging
ventures. Note the interaction effect of receiving wide IPR acclaim a revealed by forward
citations and concentration of its technological audience (Herfndahl of peers’ technology
classes) The interaction effect on failure is negative and moderately significant while the
same effect is weakly significant for the case of success,. The implication is that startups
with high citation counts form a dispersed and diverse audience tend to survive without
liquidity events, i.e. startups that some VC’s have called “living deads”.
The results obtained must be seen in the light of the limitations of the method. We
tested for the violation of proportionality assumption of the Cox model. The global test
failed. However the failure was accounted by just one control variable. Dropping that
variable does not change the results. We will also do more robustness checks and fit
competing risk models using a Mixed-Gamma distribution model in the future. We also
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did likelihood ratio tests between the models with quadratic and interaction terms to
check for spurious effects. Perhaps leave this para out?

DISCUSSION
This paper has sought to break new grounds regarding the factors that account for
the success and failures of new firms that entered a highly competitive, technologically
intense, uncertain and fluid market dominated by two classes of titans, the handset
producers and telecommunication carriers. While the setting is unique in many ways, the
wireless sector shares certain characteristics with other industries, especially around the
creation, accumulation and aprpropriability of intellectual property —for example
semiconductors, computer software and imaging. In our setting we explored the entry of
new ventures with new and future proprietary technology, whose R&D signals might
contribute to the endorsement (Stuart et al, 1999) by venture capital firms, illustrating the
two sides of the small fish in a big pond metaphor. Through future citations they receive
feedback, if not status and further endorsement regarding their innovative performance.
Yet they also expose themselves to the risk of knowledge theft, imitation, reverse
engineering, litigation and even early exit.
We have shown that such new ventures endure significant risks when they
disseminate their new technological inventions through patent filing to an audience that
often comprises larger and older competitors in the very same industry. When that signal
is highly focused and received by firms in the very same technological cluster or niche
(Podolny and Stuart, 1995), as operationalized by future citations from a relatively
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homogenous set of peers, the startup often seals its own unpleasant fate, even if future
citations in general convey positive feedback, and produce value to the firm.
Our study highlights the importance of patents as signal. We find the benefits of
their use both in the case of failure and success. Thus, our interpretation is that IPR as
signal for their underlying value in providing legitimacy outweighs endorsement of
technology with concomitant risks of reverse engineering, especially in our setting where
IP regime is not as strong as in Pharmaceuticals and Chemical. Since many high-tech
industries share this characteristic, our results are generalizable to other settings—most
notably other high technology sectors such as semiconductors. .
Perhaps the most compelling result of our study is the startup’s generality of its
technology. If its signals convey a general technologies exit is avoided, yet such strategy
is not sufficient for success. The intriguing result comes from the interaction of the
generality of the technology and the degree of deference received. In both successful and
failed scenarios, firms endowed with narrow technologies combined with high levels of
forward citation per year face a lower probability of either succeeding or failing, a
condition that VC’s often called living dead (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1987). This state
of “morbidity” obtains under conditions of small market growth or the appropriation of
created value is difficult
Being a single industry study our paper requires the usual disclaimers of
generalizability. Yet, the wireless industry represents the norm in high-technology when
dealing with of the strength of appropriability regime, compared to other common
entrepreneurial investigations such as pharmaceuticals or biotechnoly. Our methods can
also be refined and made more robust., an issue we will address in the future.
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While our study has produced some important advancements on entrepreneurship
research, , many issues remain. . Clearly, the analysis hints at a range of signals, beyond
technological innovation that startups emit, for example alliances with peers, staffing of
key positions, personal networking, press releases (e.g., Pontikes, 2010) and marketing
actions, such as the launch of new products or services. Finally, we stress two unresolved
concerns. First, while the bulk of entrepreneurial performance confines itself to success
and failure, we believe that such a simply dichotomy is misplaced. Like any set of
comparisons, we encounter variations in performance. We noted a category called “living
dead” which falls in neither the success nor failure category. Second, since the study by
Stuart, Huang and Hybels (1999) is has become taken for granted that endorsement is a
positive outcome for any fledging company and is framed as one of its most important
intangible asset. Because our results call such a claim into question, we need to acquire a
deeper understanding of deference as an implicit if not explicit endorsement behavior—
which has become so central in the current research on markets as status systems
(Podolny, 2005) and is fraught with endogeneity issues..
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Figure 1. Wireless Actors Map
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Figure 2. Global Wireless VC backed Startup Activity 1990-2009
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Figure 3. WirelessTechnologies

Figure 4. Bandwidth versus Coverage Tradeoff
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Figure 5. Wireless Startup Technology Space 1990-2009
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Table 1. Variable Definitions
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Table 2. Summary Statistics and Correlations
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Table 3a. Cox Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model - Failure
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Table 3b. Cox Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model - Success
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